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1. Introduction 
 
The development of the doctrine of international arbitration, considered 
from the standpoint of its ultimate benefits to the human race, is the most 
vital movement of modern times. In its relation to the well-being of the men 
and women of this and ensuing generations, it exceeds in importance [to] the 
proper solution of various economic problems which are constant themes of 
legislative discussion and enactment. (Taft, 1907: 1) 
 
The virtues of international arbitration are well known. However, without the ability to 
enforce foreign arbitral awards, in the event of a party to arbitration failing, refusing or 
otherwise not honouring the award, international arbitration becomes a paper tiger. This is 
why the possibility of enforcement pursuant to the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is of cardinal importance. Mindful 
of the UK’s treaty obligations under the New York Convention, this paper focuses on the 
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enforcement of foreign arbitral awards from a London perspective. It will do so for two 
reasons: London has long standing and hard won reputation as one of the truly global 
centres of international arbitration. It is also recognised as a bellwether for international 
finance.  In light of such recognition, this paper will examine the approach adopted by the 
English Judiciary to international arbitration awards and ultimately their enforcement or 
otherwise in the courts of England and Wales.   
First, it will begin by highlighting the significance of the New York Convention as the bedrock 
for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Next, the paper will consider how the terms 
of the Convention have been interpreted and applied by English Courts.  Then, the extra-
judicial comments of Lord Thomas on balancing the relationship between the courts and 
arbitration will be explored.1  In adopting this approach, a number of questions will be 
raised concerning the future development of law and the prospects for refining its 
interpretation, in particular in relation to the scope for the possibility of appeal.   
2. International Commercial Arbitration and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 
 
Arbitration is a creature of contract.  This creature exists by virtue of a dispute resolution 
clause in a contract or as a result of an agreement in writing made at a later stage between 
the parties. In either case, a key and fundamental tenet of arbitration is that the process of 
arbitration is based on consent: It cannot occur unless an agreement to arbitrate exists 
between the parties.   Arising from this consent is the agreement that the losing party will 
honour the award as and when same is rendered by the Arbitrator. Thankfully, the vast 
majority of arbitral awards are honoured (Redfern, 2015: 29). 
In order for the process of international arbitration to be effective, there must be a way of 
enforcing that a foreign arbitral award when one party resists. This leads to the question as 
1 John Thomas, Developing commercial law through the courts: rebalancing the relationship 
between the courts and arbitration, The Third Annual Bailii Lecture, Freshfields, London, 18 March 
2016. Available at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/announcements/speech-by-the-lord-chief-justice-
the-bailii-lecture-2016/ (Last visited: 19 May 2017) 
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to how the courts in one country are to be compelled to recognise and enforce an award 
rendered in another. The process is one that is facilitated by treaties of international law.  
The most significant of these treaties – the one that has the widest scope of application – is 
the 1958 New York Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.2   
The New York Convention is widely recognised as the foundational instrument of 
international arbitration.  According to Gillis Wetter, one of the early pioneers of 
international arbitration, the Convention is ‘the single most important pillar on which the 
edifice of international arbitration rests’.3  The text of the New York Convention consists of 
16 articles without a preamble. The first article states the applicability of the treaty: 
2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 38 (1958). 
As of 20 May 2017, there are 157 parties to the New York Convention: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cook 
Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Holy 
See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San 
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, State of Palestine, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, 
Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See: 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last 
visited: 20 May 2017) 
3 J. Gillis Wetter, ‘The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An 
Appraisal’ (1990) 1 American Review of International Arbitration 91-107 at 93. 
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This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of 
differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to 
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their 
recognition and enforcement are sought. 
An extremely important treaty for international trade, the New York Convention is 
recognised as having a strong pro-enforcement bias (Redfern, 2015: 569-570).  The United 
Kingdom acceded to the treaty on 24 September 1975 and, consistent with the terms of the 
Convention, the Courts of England and Wales have adopted an approach ‘friendly’ to 
arbitration (Parish, 2010: 661).   
Before exploring the relevant jurisprudence, it is necessary consider the procedures for 
enforcement envisaged by the New York Convention for the recognition and enforcement of 
awards. Article IV of the Convention states: 
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding 
article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time 
of the application, supply: 
(a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; 
(b) the original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy 
thereof. 
2. If the said award or agreement is not made in an official language of the 
country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition 
and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these 
documents into such language. The translation shall be certified by an official 
or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. 
The party which seeks recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award must therefore 
produce the arbitral award and the agreement to arbitrate before the relevant court.  These 
terms are reflected in Section 102 of the Arbitration Act 1996.  Under the terms of both the 
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New York Convention and the Arbitration Act 1996, the court must grant recognition and 
enforcement unless grounds for refusal exist.  The grounds upon which the recognition and 
enforcement of an award may be refused are listed under Article V of the Convention and 
are mirrored in section 103 of the Arbitration Act 1996:  
(1) Recognition or enforcement of a New York Convention award shall not be 
refused except in the following cases. 
(2) Recognition or enforcement of the award may be refused if the person 
against whom it is invoked proves— 
(a) that a party to the arbitration agreement was (under the law 
applicable to him) under some incapacity; 
(b) that the arbitration agreement was not valid under the law to 
which the parties subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under 
the law of the country where the award was made; 
(c) that he was not given proper notice of the appointment of the 
arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable 
to present his case; 
(d) that the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not 
falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration or contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration (but see subsection (4)); 
(e) that the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties 
or, failing such agreement, with the law of the country in which the 
arbitration took place; 
(f) that the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has 
been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country 
in which, or under the law of which, it was made. 
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(3) Recognition or enforcement of the award may also be refused if the 
award is in respect of a matter which is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration, or if it would be contrary to public policy to recognise or enforce 
the award. 
With regard to the application of these grounds, it is important to note that there is no 
review of the actual merits of an award. Section 81(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 states: 
‘Nothing in this Act shall be construed as reviving any jurisdiction of the court to set aside or 
remit an award on the ground of errors of fact or law on the face of the award.’  Neither the 
Arbitration Act nor the New York Convention provides authority for courts to substitute 
their decision for the decision of the arbitral tribunal. When an award is issued, it is deemed 
final and binding on the parties to the arbitration.  
It is also important to note that the grounds listed are exhaustive and the burden of proof 
rests on the respondent.  It is up to the party who wishes to challenge the award to furnish 
proof that one or more of the grounds listed in the New York Convention exist for refusal.  
Bearing in mind the pro-enforcement orientation of New York Convention, each of the 
grounds stated is to be construed narrowly.  
Section 103(3) – based on Article 5(2) of the New York Convention – serves to protect the 
public interests of the state.  Here the concepts of arbitrability and public policy are key.  In 
order for a dispute to be arbitrable, the subject-matter must be ‘capable of settlement by 
arbitration’ according to the terms of Article II (1) of the Convention.   Public policy in this 
context – in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards – is 
not to be equated with the concept of domestic public policy. Although no definition is 
provided in the New York Convention, public policy in the sense of Article 5(2)(b) is more 
often taken as referring to the ‘international public policy’ of a State (Moses, 2012: 228). A 
definition of the term was provided by the International Law Association in a resolution 
adopted at its 70th Conference in 2002: 
1(c) The expression "international public policy" is used … to designate the 
body of principles and rules recognised by a State, which, by their nature, 
may bar the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in the 
context of international commercial arbitration when recognition or 
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enforcement of said award would entail their violation on account either of 
the procedure pursuant to which it was rendered (procedural international 
public policy) or of its contents (substantive international public policy). 
1(d) The international public policy of any State includes: (i) fundamental 
principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to protect 
even when it is not directly concerned (ii) rules designed to serve the 
essential political, social or economic interests of the State, these being 
known as “lois de police” or “public policy rules” and (iii) the duty of the State 
to respect its obligations towards other States or international 
organisations.4 
Considered together with the grounds for refusal and the requirement of arbitrability, the 
narrow construal of public policy reflects the pro-enforcement bias of the New York 
Convention.5  This deference to the recognition and enforcement of awards is reflected in 
the approach adopted both before and after the Arbitration Act 1996 by the Courts of 
England and Wales.  The section that follows will focus on three cases to illustrate this point.  
3. The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards before the Courts of England and Wales 
 
Should a losing party have failed, refused or otherwise not honoured an arbitral award in 
full, then this private matter has the potential to enter the public domain. Then there are 
two principal methods available in England  whereby it can be enforced: 
1.) To obtain leave of the court to enforce the award in the manner as a judgment or order 
of the Court to the same effect under the summary procedure provided for by section 
66 of the Arbitration Act 1996, or  
4 International Law Association Recommendations on the Application of Public Policy as a Ground for 
Refusing Recognition or Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, Annex to Resolution 2/2002 
on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted at the 70th Conference of the International Law 
Association held in New Delhi, India, 2-6 April 2002. 
5 Honeywell International Middle East Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2014] EWHC 1344 (TCC) at para. 67. 
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2.) To bring an action on the award and then to seek a judgment from the Court for the 
same relief as is granted in the award.6 
The ex parte application to the High Court pursuant to section 66 must be supported by an 
affidavit which exhibits the arbitration agreement and the award (a certified translation into 
English if either the agreement or award is in a foreign language is also required). The 
application must further state: 
a.) The name and address of the Applicant as well as the name and the usual or last known 
place of residence or business of the person against whom it is sought to enforce the 
award; and 
b.) The award has not been complied with or, as the case may be, the extent to which it has 
not been complied with at the date of the application.7   
To illustrate how the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is interpreted by the 
Courts of England and Wales, it is useful to consider Soleimany v Soleimany,8 Honeywell 
International Middle East Limited v  Meydan Group LLC,9 and the relatively recent Supreme 
Court case of Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan.10  These cases highlight 
judicial attitude on enforcement of foreign Arbitral awards both pre- and post-1996 
Arbitration Act. In doing so, they convey a degree of deference towards the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.  
Soleimany v Soleimany provides a useful illustration of how the fact of a commercial 
practice being in conflict with public policy can be used as a basis for the refusal of an 
arbitral award. This decision of the Court of Appeal in this case of case concerned a dispute 
between a father and son over the division of proceeds from the smuggling of carpets out of 
Iran, which came to £576,574.  The carpets had been taken illegally, in breach of Iranian 
6 Arbitration Act 1996, Chapter 23, Section 66; Civil Procedure Rules, Part 62. 
7 Arbitration Act 1996, Chapter 23, Sections 66, 100, 101, 102 & 104. 
8 Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785. 
9 Honeywell International Middle East Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2014] EWHC 1344 (TCC). 
10 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs [2011] 1 AC 763. 
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revenue laws. After mediation had failed, the father and son, who were both Iranian Jews, 
agreed to arbitration by the Beth Din, a rabbinical court, with Jewish law as applicable law. 
When the son sought enforcement of the subsequent arbitral award, the father argued that 
his son’s claim was void and unenforceable in an English court due to the fact that it was 
founded on an illegal agreement. It was contended that recognition of the award would be 
contrary to public policy, pursuant to Section 26 of the Arbitration Act of 1950. This 
argument prevailed and Court of Appeal declined to enforce the award.  
The case turned on the fact that the illegality was specifically referred to in the text of the 
arbitral award: 
The court is in our view concerned to preserve the integrity of its process, 
and to see that it is not abused. The parties cannot override that concern by 
private agreement. They cannot by procuring an arbitration conceal that 
they, or rather one of them, is seeking to enforce an illegal contract. Public 
policy will not allow it.11 
The applicable law that had been chosen by the parties was Jewish law.  Under Jewish law 
the illegality was considered not relevant; it did not impact on the rights of the parties.  This 
decision of the Court of Appeal illustrates the importance of public policy considerations 
where the recognition and enforcement of any award is sought. It highlights the importance 
of protecting the integrity of the process.  While deference exists, the requirements of 
public policy place an important limitation on the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.  
The High Court case of Honeywell International Middle East Limited v Meydan Group LLC 
provides further perspective on the interpretation of public policy as a ground for refusing 
enforcement.  The claimant in this case sought enforcement of an award rendered by the 
Dubai International Financial Centre for approximately £12.6 million.  The defendant argued 
that the order for enforcement of the award should be set aside because the contract was 
procured by the Claimant bribing public servants in Dubai.   
11 Soleimany v Soleimany [1999] QB 785 at 800. 
10 
 
                                                          
The Court dismissed the application, ruling that the Meydan Group LLC could not 
substantiate the alleged bribery.  Justice Ramsey stated that ‘even if the allegation of 
bribery were made out and the bribery did in some way affect the Contract entered into 
directly between Meydan and Honeywell that would not, because of the principle of 
separability, have any effect on the arbitration agreement in Clause 20.6 of the Contract 
which is treated as a distinct agreement’.12  In addition, it was held that ‘whilst bribery is 
clearly contrary to English public policy and contracts to bribe are unenforceable, as a 
matter of English public policy, contracts which have been procured by bribes are not 
unenforceable’.13  This again highlights a deferential approach to the recognition and 
enforcement of awards and the very restrictive interpretation given to public policy in this 
context. Commenting on public policy as a ground for non-enforcement of an award, Ilias 
Bantekas notes that ‘public policy defences very rarely succeed in pro-arbitration 
industrialised states’ (Bantekas, 2015: 245).  He states that: 
[T]he regime of the 1958 New York Convention (and international 
commercial arbitration more generally) is not fragmented or distinct from 
general international law. Hence, a construction of public policy by the forum 
should not lead to the recognition and enforcement of awards encompassing 
transnational and international offences.  (Bantekas, 2015: 245). 
The pro-enforcement approach employed in Honeywell was refined in the 2010 Supreme 
Court case of Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan.  This case turned on the 
question of who was named as party to an arbitration agreement.  The background of this 
case concerned the proposed funding of accommodation for the Hajj in Saudi Arabia by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan.  Pakistan established the Awami 
Hajj Trust as a convenient vehicle for the project.  The negotiations between Dallah and the 
government culminated in an agreement, which was expressly made between Dallah and 
the Trust.  The government was not expressed to be a party to the agreement, nor did it 
12 Honeywell International Middle East Ltd v Meydan Group LLC [2014] EWHC 1344 (TCC) at para. 93. 
13 Ibid., para. 185. 
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sign it in any capacity.  Relatively soon thereafter there was a change in government and the 
Trust entity ceased to exist.  
Pursuant to the arbitration agreement contained in the contract, arbitration was held in 
Paris. The arbitral tribunal made an initial interim award wherein they found that the trust 
was the alter ego of Pakistan and that Pakistan was therefore a true party to the agreement.  
Subsequently, the arbitral tribunal issued substantial money damages award against the 
Government of Pakistan.  Ultimately, Dallah sought enforcement of these awards in 
England.   
In its decision on the claimant's appeal, it was held that ‘the English court is entitled (and 
indeed bound) to revisit the question of the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction if the party 
resisting enforcement seeks to prove that there was no arbitration agreement binding upon 
it under the law of the country where the award was made.’14  While the Supreme Court 
held that it was necessary to revisit the decision of the arbitral tribunal, this did not imply 
change to the ‘pro-enforcement’ policy reflected in the New York Convention: 
It is true that the trend, both national and international, is to limit 
reconsideration of the findings of arbitral tribunals, both in fact and in law. It 
is also true that the Convention introduced a “pro-enforcement” policy for 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The New York 
Convention took a number of significant steps to promote the enforceability 
of awards … The New York Convention does not require double exequatur 
and the burden of proving the grounds for non-enforcement is firmly on the 
party resisting enforcement. Those grounds are exhaustive.15  
The position adopted by the Supreme Court in Dallah is consistent with earlier case-law.  
The New York Convention is ‘pro-enforcement’ in its orientation; the grounds listed for non-
enforcement are exhaustive and are to interpreted in terms consistent with the object and 
14 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs [2011] 1 AC 763 at para. 
104. 
15 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs [2011] 1 AC 763 at para. 
101. 
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purpose of the treaty.  The possibility of appeal on a point of law is also been extremely 
limited under Section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.  In accommodating finality in the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, the courts have strengthened the 
perception of England and Wales as jurisdiction that is friendly to arbitration.  The section 
that follows will examine a development that has been described as a ‘threat’ to the 
‘arbitration-friendly’ reputation of jurisdiction and the status of London as a world-leading 
centre for arbitration.   
4. Rebalancing the Relationship between the Courts and Arbitration 
 
On 9 March 2016 the Right Hon. Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice (LCJ) of 
England and Wales delivered the 4th Bailii lecture and used this opportunity to reflect on 
commercial law and arbitration. The lecture was entitled ‘Developing commercial law 
through the courts: rebalancing the relationship between the courts and arbitration’ (2016).  
The LCJ intimated his view that the courts deference to arbitration had in certain spheres 
been detrimental to the growth and development of commercial law.  He advanced a 
position that in order for the common law to grow and develop in certain areas of 
commercial Law, there should be a ‘healthy diet’ of appeals for higher courts, enabling the 
development of the law in these areas.  The LCJ commented that since the introduction of 
the test contained in section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, ‘far fewer appeals from arbitral 
awards come before the courts, as only a small number satisfy the test for the grant of 
permission to appeal ... the effect in reducing cases coming to the court has been dramatic.’ 
(2016: para 21).  Accordingly, the LCJ suggested that one way of achieving a ‘proper diet of 
commercial cases’ would be to change the existing restriction on appeals in section 69 of 
the Arbitration Act:  
I have no doubt that change to the section 69 test is one of the options that 
must be considered. The restriction in relation to appeals where the question 
is one of general public importance is, I have little doubt, a serious 
impediment to the growth of the common law. The benefits to the 
development of the common law is therefore obvious as it would increase 
the potential for greater numbers of appeals which would provide the means 
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to maintain a healthy diet of appellate decisions, capable of developing the 
law particularly on issues of general public importance (2016: para 34). 
While these were extra-judicial comments, it is important to recognise that they reflect the 
thinking of an individual who is positioned at the apex of the English and Welsh judicial 
hierarchy.  As such, these comments can not be treated as throw away remarks.  With 
regard to the effect on the development of the law, the LCJ states: 
The effect of the diminishing number of appeals compounds the problem 
that arises from the diversion of more claims from the courts to arbitration. It 
reduces the potential for the courts to develop and explain the law. This 
consequence provides fertile ground for transforming the common law from 
a living instrument into, as Lord Toulson put it in a different context, “an 
ossuary” … [T]he consequence has been the undermining of the means 
through which much of the common law’s strength – its “excellence” was 
developed – a danger not merely to those engaged in dispute resolution in 
London, but more importantly to the development of the common law as the 
framework to underpin the international markets, trade and commerce. 
(2016: para 22) 
As the default method of dispute resolution in a wide swayed of commercial areas, 
arbitration prevents the ‘diet’ of appeals referred to by Lord Thomas reaching the Supreme 
Court.  Being dealt with in the main outside the judicial system, they are not subject to 
review or public scrutiny. This has the effect of ‘retarding public understanding of the law, 
and public debate over its application’. (Thomas, 2016: para 23) 
The comments of Lord Thomas caused shock in the London arbitral community and gave 
rise to a number of responses to rebut or diminish the kernels of his argument, in particular 
in relation to the potential negative effect of arbitration on the evolution of commercial law. 
In an article published in The Times entitled ‘Reforms will threaten London’s place as a 
world arbitration centre’, Lord Saville stated: 
From the international point of view, any suggestion that the English courts 
be permitted to interfere in the arbitral process by substituting their 
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decisions for those of the tribunal chosen by the parties is regarded with little 
short of astonishment. The parties have expressly agreed to use arbitration 
as their method of dispute resolution. By doing so they have agreed to accept 
the decision of their chosen tribunal instead of that of the court. What the 
English court would have decided is irrelevant. 
I must therefore disagree with the lord chief justice. I have no doubt that any 
move to expand the right of appeal from arbitration awards would be a 
wholly retrograde step. Far from helping to develop English law, it would be 
calculated to drive international commercial arbitration away from London, 
to the great loss of this country.16 
Concurring with the position expressed by Saville, Sir Bernard Eder used his keynote address 
to the London Branch of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators to the express his ‘strong 
view’ that there should be no change to section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.17  Likewise, 
William Rowley QC in a bulletin for 20 Essex Street entitled ‘London Arbitration Under 
Attack’ stated:  
With the greatest respect to his Lordship, when regard is had to the nature 
and size of the caseloads of the Commercial Court, the Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, his argument 
seems nothing short of astonishing. It is true, of course, that English appellate 
courts now hear fewer arbitration appeals because of the changes made by 
the 1996 Act, but when the number of commercial cases that come before 
the Commercial Court and the appellate courts are considered, his argument 
seems unsupportable. (2016: 5) 
16 Mark Saville, ‘Reforms will threaten London's place as a world arbitration centre’ The Times 
(London), 28 April 2016, p. 58. 
17 Bernard Eder, ‘Does arbitration stifle development of the law? Should s.69 be revitalised?’, 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (London Branch): AGM Keynote Address, Essex Court Chambers, 
28 April 2016, available at: https://essexcourt.com/recent-keynote-address-chartered-institute-
arbitrators-sir-bernard-eder (last visited: 19 May 2017). 
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The positions expressed by Saville, Eder and Rowley highlight the fact that the businesses 
who seek to have their dispute resolved in England (including those seeking enforcement of 
arbitral awards), would prefer to have the certainty of their dispute being resolved by 
arbitration than the possibility of being ‘sucked into’ the judicial system.  The primary 
concern of parties engaged in such disputes is in their resolution, not in the growth and 
development of the common law.  
Rather than to delve into the detail of the positions for and against the reform Arbitration 
Act 1996, it is sufficient to state that these comments indicate the existence of a debate that 
is likely to continue for some time.  Until written judgments delivered from the bench 
replicate the extrajudicial comments of Lord Thomas, it is not possible to replace the ‘may’ 
or ‘could’ with ‘will’ or ‘should’.  It is clear that Lord Thomas’ comments have raised a 
number of significant questions for the future development of the law and by extension the 
reception of international arbitral awards in the judicial system and their ultimate 
enforcement by English and Welsh Courts. Only time will tell how these questions will be 
dealt with, or whether London will retain its privileged place as a centre for the settlement 
of disputes through international commercial arbitration.   
5. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, while the New York Convention is the capstone of international arbitration, its 
effectiveness rests on the attitude of domestic courts in the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. In the cases highlighted, one can glean the common thread of a pro-
enforcement stance, with a willingness to consider disputes on their individual merits. This 
willingness to expose an award to robust examination should only increase parties’ 
confidence in the integrity of this private dispute resolution process. In light of Lord 
Thomas’s extra-judicial comments, and the potential that the Law Commission may review 
the Arbitration Act 1996 as part of its 13th programme of law reform,18 a cloud has appeared 
on an otherwise clear horizon.  Whether Lord Thomas’s proposed rebalancing of the 
18 See: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/arbitration/ (last visited: 20 May 2017)  
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relationship between the courts and arbitration occurs, or whether the current status quo is 
maintained, the judicial reception in London is positive and outlook remains favourable. 
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